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In The Supreme Court 
Of The State of Utah 
DORA H. STEVENS, CONNIE JOY 
LEIGH, JACK HOLT STEVENS and 
ALICE DAYLE ESPLIN, 
Plaintiffs and appellants, 
vs. 
\ 
COLORADO FUEL & IRON, a corp- / 
oration, for whom UNITED STATES 
STEEL CORPORATION has been sub-
stituted, and EMPLOYERS MUT-
UALS OF WAUSAU, a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case 
No. 11808 
This case calls for a review of a memorandum de-
cision of the Honorable C. Nelson Day. District Judge 
of the Fifth Judicial District of Utah on a case arising 
out of the District Court of Iron County, Utah, said mem-
orandum decision being dated the 26th day of July, 1969, 
filed by the Clerk on the 29th of July, 1969. This matter 
arose on a motion to dismiss and motion to strike off 
the defendant United States Steel Corporation, dated 
the 26th day of August, 1966, argued thereafter and ta-
ken under advisement for a considerable period of time 
thereafter. The motion to strike was not acted upon. 
The memoraudum decision granted the motion to dis-
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miss, in effect saying that the amended complaint of 
the plaintiffs should be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief could be had. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter was originally filed naming Colorado 
Fuel & Iron, a corporation, and Employers Mutuals of 
Wausau, a corporation, defendants, upon a mistaken 
concept of the factual situation pertaining to the death 
of one Albert W. Stevens who died as an employee of 
Utah Construction & Mining Company out of an acci-
dent that occurred on the 19th day of August, 1964, 
the death occurring the 21st day of August, 1964. 
This original complaint was filed upon a theory that 
Utah Construction Company was an operating Com-
pany for Colorado Fuel & Iron, and Colorado Fuel 
& Iron had failed to make the place safe for the employ-
ees of Utah Construction Company. Employers Mutuals 
of Wausau, a corporation, was joined, inasmuch as a 
maximum award had been made by the Utah State In-
dustrial Commission on the death, and Employers Mut-
uals of Wausau was and is paying periodic payments on 
the death of Albert W. Stevens based upon this finding. 
Upon being apprised and ascertaining that the death 
actually occurred on a different operation from the orig-
inal concept, plaintiffs filed a motion to substitute 
United States Steel Corporation for Colorado Fuel & 
Iron. This substitution was allowed by the court. Also 
an amended complaint was filed by permission of the 
court. A motion to dismiss of Employers Mutuals of 
Wausau was denied and said defendant was given twen-
ty days to answer. Said defendant was so noticed on 
the 17th day of December, 1965, but no answer for said 
defendant has been filed to date. Although the default 
has never been entered, Employers Mutuals of Wausau 
is in default. 
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When it was ascertained that the plaintiffs' orig-
inal concept of the operation on which the death occur-
red was erroneous, the Honorable C. Nelson Day grant-
ed a motion to file an amended complaint and motion 
for substitution of parties, allowing United States Steel 
Corporation to be substituted as defendant for Colorado 
Fuel & Iron, a orporation, and a voluntary dismissal 
as against Colorado Fuel & Iron was effected. Service 
was obtained on United States Steel Corporation who 
made an entry of appearance in the due course of events. 
The primary change in the amended complaint, in addi-
tion to changing the parties, was moving the site of the 
accident to the place where the accident that caused 
the death actually occurred. Albert W. Stevens, before 
his death, had been shifted to an operation of Utah Con-
struction Company in connection with Colorado Fuel & 
Iron, in which Utah Construction was an operating com-
pany for Colorado Fuel & Iron , and the morning on 
which the accident occurred from which he died, Albert 
W. Stevens was shifted back to the operation conducted 
by Utah Construction Company either as an operator 
or as a tenant of United States Steel Corporation. The 
motion to dismiss of United States Steel Corporation 
filed in 1966 was granted in 1969. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-appellants seek to have the Supreme 
Court review the trial court's action in allowing the 
motion to dismiss the amended complaint as served 
against United States Steel Corporation, and to have 
the act of dismissal set aside and the defendant United 
States Steel Corporation required to answer, and the 
matter go to a jury trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs-appellants are the widow and the 
heirs at law of the late Albert W. Stevens, deceased. The 
plaintiff, Dora H. Stevens, in addition to being a wod-
ow, is a dependent of said Albert W. Stevens, deceased. 
Long prior to the death of Albert W. Stevens, a subsid-
iary of United States Steel Corporation, to-wit, Colum-
bia Iron Mining Company, owned and operated mining 
claims on the Lindsay Hill in the Iron Springs Mining 
District in Iron County, Utah. On or about the 13th day 
of December, J 963, said corporation merged with United 
States Steel Corporation, and at the time complained of, 
these claims were the property of United States Steel 
Corporation. Some of the records of Iron County have 
not been changed to show this merger, but since the 
13th day of December, 1963, all claims in the Lindsay 
Hill area of the Iron Springs Mining District that were 
formerly owned by the Columbia Iron Mining Company 
have actually been owned by the United States Steel 
Corporation. This was the condition on or about the 19th 
day of August, 1964, to and including the 21st day of 
August, 1964. 
On or about the 31st day of December, 1949, the 
Coluumbia Iron Mining Company and Utah Construc-
tion & Mining Company entered into a document called 
an operating agreement by the terms of which Colum-
bia Iron Mining Company attempted to sell said Utah 
Construction & Mining Company ore in the area on said 
Lindsay Hill known as the Lindsay, Wanderer, Little 
Allie, Belgium and Cora No. 1 Lode Mining Claims, un-
der the terms of which said agreement said ore could be 
removed and stockpiled and later sold. There was no 
obligation to pay for said ore until it was sold, and noth-
ing was paid upon removal. There was a specific provi-
sion that any ore sold to Columbia Iron Mining Company 
""""' 
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would be sold without a royalty having been paid on 
same, and Utah Construction & Mining Companv was 
paid for removing the ore under these conditio.ns by 
some method not set forth in the agreement. Columbia 
Iron Mining Company was the primary purchaser and 
purchased in excess of 95<1 ( of all ore so removed, and 
as a matter of practice, this amounted to an operation 
agreement whereby Utah Construction was paid for the 
removal of ore by Columbia Iron Mining Company. No 
co-mingling of ore was allowed in the stockpiles, even 
though stockpiled on property of Utah Construction & 
l\IIining Company, and only at the time of shipment was 
any co-mingling allowed. Also, the only time there was 
any payment to be due to Columbia Iron Mining Com-
pany from Utah Construction was in the event ore was 
sold to any other party in accordance with the royalty 
provisions. As a matter of practical fact, United States 
::;tee! Corporation was the only purchaser of the oi... 
from these mining claims under said agreement, and 
as a matter of practical operation, said agreement was 
nothing but an agreement for the removal of ore, the 
property of Columbia Iron Mining Company, by Utah 
Construction Company. The reason for said agreement 
is immaterial as far as this suit is concerned. 
In 1961, this agreement was modified, but in no 
way changed the principal agreement. Although said 
agreement contained a provision for the payment of 
royalty, as a matter of fact this provision was not 
effective until the iron ore was actually sold to some-
one else, and in the event the ultimate consumer was 
Columbia Iron Mining Company, there was never any 
amount paid under the royalty provisions of the agree-
ment. 
At the time of the merger, on or about the 13th 
day of December, 1963, United States Steel Corporation, 
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the defendant, took over the position of Columbia Iron 
Mining Company, and under those conditions became a 
party to those agreement directly. Since that time United 
States Steel Corporation has been the only purchaser of 
said mined ores under said agreement, and Utah Con-
struction & Mining Company has never paid any royal-
ty under the terms of said agreement. As a matter of 
practical effect, this agreement is nothing but an oper-
ation agreement by the terms of which the Utah Con-
struction and Mining Company operated the area in 
question for United States Steel Corporation. 
Albert W. Stevens, deceased, had worked for Utah 
Construction Company long prior to the merger. Dur-
ing the two weeks prior to the 19th of August, 1964, Al-
bert W. Stevens had not been working in this particular 
area, but had been working in a different area for a 
different crew, still in the employment of Utah Con-
struction & Mining Company. This was on the Colorado 
Fuel & Iron operation. On the morning of the 19th of 
August, 1964, Albert W. Stevens returned to the crew 
he had been \Vorking with, and was instructed to dump 
low-grade ore from the claims of United States Steel 
on low-grade stockpile No. 8. While he had been away 
from the crew, the end of this stockpile had been un-
dermined. and there was a precipitous face on same 
approximately 80 feet in height. There were no safety 
provisions whatsoever for the dumping by trucks. The 
truck operated by Mr. Stevens had a gross weight of 
approximately 110 tons, and carried approximately 70 
tons of ore. Normal procedure was to back this truck 
to the edge and hoist same, dumping the ore over the 
edge of the stockpile. On a normal slope, this was nor-
mally a safe operation. However, on a precipitous slope, 
this placed the entire weight of the truck on the two 
rear wheels within a few inches of the edge of the pre-
cipitous slopp which had been undermined during the 
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absence of Mr. Stevens, and of \vhich he had no knowl-
edge, and on which there were no safety precautions 
taken whatsoever. The bank gave way and the truck 
cartwheeled down the slopP with the cab being on the 
outside of the cartwheel, and Mr. Stevens landed on 
his head on the roof of the steel cab. He died from his 
injuries two days later. This particular pile of low-
grade ore was the exclusive property of United States 
Steel Corporation under the provisions of the so-called 
operating agreement, and the pile contained no ore 
except that removed from claims of United States Steel 
Corporation. The ore had not been paid for under any 
operating or lease agreement by Utah Construction 
Company at the time of said accident, and there was 
no duty to pay for same until it was removed from said 
stockpile, even if sold to another party. As of the 19th 
day of August, 1964, no flags or warning of any kind 
were put into effect by either United States Steel Cor-
poration or Utah Construction & Mining Company, or 
any person or persons working for either company as 
to the dangerous condition of the east end of said low-
grade ore stockpile No. 8. No inspections had been made 
of same whatsoever by either United States Steel Cor-
poration or Utah Construction & Mining Company. Had 
inspections been made on a regular basis this condi-
tion would have been ascertained, and had it been as-
certained, reasonable steps should have been taken for 
the safety of operating personnel. 
At the time of his death, Albert W. Stevens had 
been steadily employed as a truck driver by Utah Con-
struction & Mining Company for several years, and on 
said date was approximately 54 years of age, and was 
steadily employed at a wage scale of $3.285Vt per hour, 
working eight hours per day for five days a week. He 
was not at any time advised that said low-grade stock-
pile No. 8 was in any other than a normal condition, or 
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that a precipitous condition had been created on the 
east end thereof. Only one load of ore had been dump-
ed on this day previous to Mr. Steven's first trip there, 
and this ore was not dumped over the precipitous end. 
At the time of the injury which resulted in the death 
of Mr. Stevens. qualified engineers and safety personnel 
were available to United States Steel Corporation on a 
permanent basis, ':vithin a few miles of said low-grade 
stockpile on which said accident occurred that caused 
his death, had said defendant, United States Steel Cor-
poration seen fit to inquire as to the conditions under 
which these men worked. 
The purpose of maintaining said low-grade stock-
piles No. 8 was exclusively for removing the ore from 
same to answer ore requirements of United States Steel 
Corporation, and said stockpile was used exclusively 
to store ore removed from the claims of United States 
Steel Corporation. Said ore was being held in said stock-
pile for the exclusive benefit of United State Steel 
Corporation as a matter of practical effect. The removal 
of said ore was controlled by the ore requirements of 
United States Steel Corporation, and this ore, at the 
time of the injury and death of Albert W. Stevens, was 
one of the primary sources of ore for the Geneva works 
of United States Steel Corporation. At no time were 
safety inspections made by United States Steel Corpor-
tion. United States Steel Corporation, as owner of said 
ore had a duty to inspect to see that all employees were 
working under safe conditions. This duty applied to em-
ployees of contractors as well as employees of United 
States Steel Corporation. United States Steel Corpora-
tion did not perform this duty at all. 
Almost immediately after the truck driven by said 
Albert W. Stevens, deceased, toppled over the precipi-
tous edge of the stockpile, material was caused to be 
dumped as a balTicade several yards \\·est of said pre-
cipitous edge, so that it would be impossible for another 
vehicle to approach said edge, but this action of barri-
cading was not a normal precaution and was not done 
on other 10\v-grade stockpiles or waste piles that did 
not have a precipitous edge as did lo\\ -grade stockpile 
No. 8. 
On or· about the 1st day of October, 1964, the In-
dustrial Commission of Utah made an order requiring 
the defendant Employers Mutuals of Wausau to pay to 
the plaintiff, Dora H. Stevens, as dependent wife of 
said Albert W. Stevens, the sum of $12,002.00 in pay-
ments of $42.85 per week, commencing the 19th day 
of August, 1964, and continuing for 280-117 weeks. By 
the provisions of Title 35-1-62, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, and amendments thereto, said defendant, Em-
ployers Mutuals of Wausau, is subrogated to the rights 
of the plaintiff for the amounts it has actually paid un-
der said award. 
Said agreement bet\veen Columbia Iron Mining 
Company and Utah Construction & Mining Company 
has not been revised since the merger The price paid 
per ton by United States Steel Corporation has not been 
comr.iensurate with the market price of ore of the same 
quality at the time of delivery, and the practical effect 
of said agreement is that it is an operating agreement 
for the mining of iron ore by Utah Construction & Min-
ing Company as an agent of United States Steel Corp-
oration. At all times, said mining and stockpiling has 
been controlled by the dictates of the Geneva works of 
United States Steel and at all times the 
ore in said stockpile No. 8 has been thP property of 
United States Steel Corporation and has been kept in 
existence and segregated as such primarily for the use 





THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS MEMOR-
ANDUM DECISION OF 26 AUGUST 1969. 
It is quite apparent that the trial court erred in 
this matter. Finding No. 6 shows that plaintiffs' attorney 
entirely failed to make the trial court even remotely 
aware of the position of the plaintiffs. This finding 
states, "The Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that 
the said decedent Stevens was not in the category of 
and employee of the United States Steel Corporation. 
All of the Utah cases appear to base the test of employ-
er-employee relationship on the right of supervision 
and control. In this case there appeared to be none 
whatever." 
This can only show the entire failure of the trial 
court to grasp the situation that the plaintiffs were 
faced with. At no place in any pleading, memorandum, 
or any other item, was the statement ever made that 
the decedent was an employee of United States Steel 
Corporation. The entire effort of the plaintiffs had been 
on the basis that United States Steel Corporation was 
a third person \\,'ith a duty to make the entire area safe 
for the employees of its contractors under the provis-
ions of Title 35-1-62, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and 
amendments thereto. The test the trial court applied, 
and upon which it based its decision, was an employee-
employer relationship. 
The trial court entirely failed to make any finding 
whatsoever as to whether or not United States Steel 
was a third party under the provisions of Title 35-1-62, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Although this was men-
tioned in Paragraph 5 of the memorandum decision as 
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the contention of the plaintffs, there is nu finding what-
soever on this point. Cntil there is a finding on this 
point, this mat1er is not settled. 
The other part of ddendant's motion for dismissal 
which apparently b not aC'ted upon by the court, is that 
workmen's compensation a\\ ard is a bar to recoverey by 
the plaintiffs from the defendant. This is specifically 
contrary to the provision of Title 33-1-62, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. Cast>s are legion that the only person 
\\'ho is protected under this provision is the employer, 
l 1tah Construction Company, and may be found in Johan-
son v. Cudahy Packing Co. 107 Utah 114, 152 P2d 98, 
and various other items, and 101 Utah :n9. which de-
nies a rehearing on this case. This Johanson v. Cudahy 
Packing Company decision was approved and followed 
by the Federal Courts in Jay v. Chicago Brides and Iron 
Co. 150 Fed 2d 247. 
The pleadings specifically alleged the death of Al-
bert W. Stevens, deceased, to be as a result of United 
States Steel Corporation's failure to perform certain 
acts it had a duty to perform. The theory in the case of 
Rugg v. Tolman, 39 Utah 295 117 P 54. 37. which sets 
out the basis of justifying a recovery of exemplary dam-
ages to the effect that the act the injury must 
be done with an evil intent, has now been refined to a 
question of "Positive misconduct manifesting a consci-
ous disregard of the rights of others and reckless in-
difference to consequences." This is set forth in Wilson 
v. Oldroyd, J Utah 2d 362, 267 P:2d 730. This is also af-
firmed in the case of Calhoun v. Uni\'ersal Credit Com-
pany, 106 Utah 166, 146 P2d 284. This has even bePn car-
ried to the rendition of damages in a "Uit for trespass 
by horses. Punitive damages were upheld and allowed 
by the trial court and the Supreme Court of Utah in the 
case of Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 1:"i2, 379 P2d 380, 
on the basis "Defendant's wrong persisted with an in-
12 
difference to the consequences and to plaintiff's rights." 
Certainly under the case at bar, we have a corn. 
plete indifference to the consequences by failure to 
make an inspection and to make the place safe for a 
man to work and to handle this tremendously heavy 
machinery. Certainly, creating a trap of this nature, 
where a precipitous bank is made 80 feet high without 
support, with ore to be dumped over the end of it by 
trucks weighing in excess of 100 tons, in which the dump 
mechanism places all the weight on the back, demon-
strates a callous and indifferent attitude for the safety 
of employees, and demonstrates an indifference to the 
consequences and to the rights of an employee. Certain-
ly this is a reckless desregard of the rights of an indi-
vidual, and evidences a wrongful motive as well as in-
tent of indifference to the consequences. 
The right to sue someone besides an employer for 
an item of this nature, where there is a duty on other 
people to make places safe for employment, is set forth 
in Johnson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P2d 98, 107 Utah 
114. This case and the cases following it are leading 
cases to the effect that third parties may be sued under 
these conditions, regardless of the Workmens Compen-
sation Act. In the case of Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum 
Co., 3 Utah 2d 203, 282 P2d 304, plaintiff was cleaning 
an employer's truck, who was a distributee of defend· 
ant, cleaning being on the premises of the defendant. 
Plaintiff fell off the ramp into a vat of caustic soda. 
Employer was covered by the Workmen's Compensation 
Act, and compensation was paid thereunder. In this 
case, the Supreme Court of Utah held that the action 
could be maintained against the third party, regardless 
of the compensation, and that although the compensa· 
tion carrier had a right of action against the defend-
ant, same was not exclusive, with the following state-
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rnent, "The duty owed by an owner of land to a busi-
ness visitor is to inspect and maintain his premises in a 
reasonably safe condition or to warn the visitor of any 
dengcrous conditions existing thereon.'' 
This is exactly the same situation we have in the 
case at bar: Ore owned by United State Steel was put 
in a stockpile. At no time was there every any safety in-
spection. For this fact, see the deposition of Clayton S. 
Lewis, Page 9, Line 25, to Page 11, Line 12. and Page 20, 
Line 6, to Page 21, Line 26. There was never any check 
by the United States Steel Corporation. Sec the deposition 
of Clayton S. Lewis, Page '.21, Line 13, to Page 21, Line 
'.26, and if there is any question concerning the owner-
ship of the ore, see the statements in the depositions 
concerning the ore being stockpiled according to owner-
ship and the claims it came from: The deposition of York 
Jones, Page 18, Line 24, to Page 19, Line 29; the deposi-
tion of Clayton S. Lewis, Page 3, Line 20, to Page 6, Line 
7, and Page 8, Line 16 to Page 9, Line 24; the deposition 
of Morton E. Pratt concerning co-mingling of ores not 
being done in the low-grade stockpiles. and piles being 
kept separate based upon the claims they came from, 
Page J2, Line 19, to Page 13, Line 12, and Page 15, Line 
12, to Page J 7, Line 6. 
Concerning the general operation of the stockpile, 
see the deposition of York Jones, Page 14, Line 2, to Page 
15, Line 12, and the deposition of Morton E. Pratt, Page 
5, Line 22, to Page 10, Line 3. Concerning the sales of the 
ore and co-mingling at that point, see the deposition of 
Morton E. Pratt, Page 11, Line 8, to Page 12, Line 10. 
Pertaining to whether or not there was any assump-
tion of risk by the deceased which to point date has not 
been raised, see the case of v. Allen, 1 Utah 2d 
79, 262 P2d 285, which upon the trier of facts the 
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presumption that the decendent used due care for his 
own safety in the absence of a prima facie showing to 
the contrary. 
Also,, see the case of Evans v. Sturart, 17 Utah 2d 
308, 410, P2d 999. 
CONCLUSION 
Under these conditions, it can be clearly seen that 
plaintiffs' counsel entirely failed to make the trial court 
aware of plaintiffs' theory of the case, and the circum-
stances that brought same about; even though finding 
No. 5 is in contention that defendant failed in its duty of 
inspection and were in fact grossly negligent which prox-
imately caused or contributed to Mr. Stevens' death, and 
that therefore recovery may be had under the provisions 
of Title 35-1-62 Utah Code Annotated 1953, on the ques-
tion of a third person the trial court failed to make any 
finding whatsoever on this particular point, but went off 
on a question of employee-employer relationship. 
Under these conditions there can be no question ex-
cept that the trial court's memorandum decision is in er· 
ror, and that this matter should be reversed, and an Iron 
County jury allowed to assess damages in connection 
with the death of Albert \V. Stevens. 
RELIEF DESIRED 
Plaintiffs desire that the memorandum decision be 
reversed; that the defendant United States Steel Corpor-
ation be given a reasonable time to answer, and that 
thereafter the matter be set for trial before an Iron 
County jury for findings and assessment of damages in 
accordance with the law. 
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Respectfully submitted. 
PATRICK H. FEI\TOI\ 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
13 'Nest Hoover A\enue 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
